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Abstract
I present a model to assess the impact of demand-side factors on the concentration of sales
within large product assortments. Consumers face a search problem within an assortment of hor-
izontally di¤erentiated products supplied by a monopolist. They may search for a product match
by drawing products from the assortment or by seeking word of mouth recommendations from
other consumers. Product evaluations prior to purchase and word of mouth are shown to arise
endogenously, and increase the concentration of sales. I show that taste matching mechanisms
such as recommender systems, which allow consumers to obtain product recommendations from
others with similar preferences, reduce sales concentration by generating a long tail e¤ect, an
increase in the tail of the sales distribution. Insights are derived on the mechanisms driving con-
centration in artistic markets and their strategic implications for the rm. The model is suited
for experience good markets such as music, cinema, literature and video game entertainment.
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1 Introduction
The expansion and development of electronic commerce in recent years has brought radical change
to the distribution landscape. Products previously limited to specialized stores are now only clicks
away from delivery, o¤ering consumers access to a larger variety of goods than ever before. This
evolution has been most noticeable in product categories such as books, music and lms, where
assortment sizes have increased dramatically. For example, Amazon sells over 3 million book titles
compared to the 100.000 stocked by an average Barnes & Noble store.1 The digitalization of content
paired with the advent of digital distribution is further fueling this trend. Observers and industry
analysts have proposed that online distribution will increase the market share of products catering
to niche audiences, increasing their participation in the sales mix with respect to the traditional
distribution channel. This phenomenon was coined by Anderson [3] as the long tail, referring to
the increase in the tail of the sales distribution. As empirical studies turn their attention to the
available data and the mechanisms driving these changes are discussed, the long tail has become
an object of academic debate.
Increased availability of products is understood to be the explanatory factor for this phenom-
enon, given that more niche consumers can now access their preferred products through the online
channel. Some of these transactions were previously excluded from the market due to the logistical
constraints of traditional distribution, which limited the availability of products with a low mar-
ket share. However, recent studies suggest that factors beyond availability are driving down sales
concentration. Brynjolfsson et al. [7] analyze the sales distribution of a clothing retailer o¤ering
the same product selection across two separate channels: catalog and online. Both channels o¤er
equal prices and conditions. Considering consumers that purchase through both channels, they
nd that sales concentration is lower online. In another study, Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee [12]
report decreasing sales concentration within a sample of video titles over a ve year period. Their
data source covers both online and o­ ine retail channels. By controlling for the introduction of
new titles in the market, they conclude the changes observed are driven by demand side e¤ects and
online retailing. Both studies suggest that the online channel is triggering changes in consumption
1See Brynjolfsson et al. [8].
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patterns, but the drivers of these changes are not well understood.
This paper presents a model that can rationalize these facts. Our approach is motivated by
the impact of the Internet on consumersproduct discovery process. The Internet is increasingly
enabling consumers to locate and interact with others that share their product taste, with inde-
pendence of geographical distance and the prevalence of their taste in the population. Our model
explains how improved taste matching reduces the concentration of sales. The result stems from
modeling word of mouth processes, the direct exchange of product recommendations among con-
sumers. We show that word of mouth benets mass market products and mainstream consumers
the most. Product market shares, on the one hand, enjoy increasing returns to appealing to a larger
share of the consumer population. The benets derived by consumers, on the other hand, exhibit
increasing returns to the prevalence of their taste in the population. Both asymmetries dissipate
when taste matching is introduced in the word of mouth process, increasing the e¢ ciency of the
information exchange and reducing the concentration of sales.
Mechanisms improving taste matching are pervasive online. Search engines, message boards,
fan communities, peer-to-peer le sharing networks and social networks allow consumers to easily
locate others that share their taste in order to discover new products. Our model explains how
taste matching reduces search costs in the market, increasing consumer participation and rm
prots. Major online retailers have seized this opportunity by deploying recommender systems
in their storefronts. These systems automate the matching process by generating personalized
recommendations for consumers (e.g. customers who bought this item also bought...). This is
achieved by processing data on consumer preferences retrieved, for example, from product purchase
and browsing history, product ratings and consumer demographics. While the development of
these technologies has been pioneered by online retailers, other market participants with access to
consumer data such as traditional retailers and nancial intermediaries are following. By better
exploiting consumer information to provide valuable product recommendations, rms can sustain
a competitive advantage.
To the best of our knowledge, no previous theoretical work has explored the link between word-
of-mouth and sales concentration. We consider a market of horizontally di¤erentiated products
supplied by a monopolist at a common price. The monopolist may be an electronic retailer or
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content provider o¤ering a large product assortment. Consumer preferences partition the product
space into preferred and non-preferred products, and consumers only derive utility from the con-
sumption of the former. But consumers arrive to the market uninformed and cannot identify their
preferred products within the assortment. All products are ex-ante identical, and the value of each
product can only be determined by sampling it. A product match is achieved when a consumer
locates a product which belongs to her preferred set. But sampling products is costly, as it requires
time and attention, and thus consumers face a search problem to locate relevant products.
To enrich the demand side of the market, we let consumers di¤er in their product preferences
and sampling costs. Consumers search for a match by sampling products, and may either draw
products directly from the assortment or seek word of mouth recommendations from others. When
consumers draw from the assortment, we show that improved product exploration increases the
concentration of sales. That is, improving consumersability to sample products and better inform
their purchases cannot explain the long tail.
Consumers seeking recommendations learn from the population of consumers that already lo-
cated a match by drawing products from the assortment, and we nd that consumers choose to seek
and follow recommendations because they increase their probability of locating a product match.
Mainstream consumers, those whose preferences are more prevalent in the population, benet more
from word of mouth because recommendations are more likely to originate from others that share
their taste, thus enjoying a larger probability of locating a match. Niche consumers with less
prevalent preferences benet less, and may not seek recommendations. We then introduce a taste
matching mechanism that allows consumers to obtain recommendations from those that share their
preferences. We show that matching improves the probability of locating a match for all consumers,
yielding a larger benet to niche consumers and reducing the concentration of sales as a result.
The construction is well suited for experience goods such as music, lms, books or video games.
The satisfaction derived from these products is hard to anticipate; it can be argued that however
informed a consumer may be on the objective characteristics of a product, such as genre, character-
istics or plot, personal judgment requires direct exposure. Furthermore, due to exogenous factors
beyond those explored here, price dispersion across titles is generally low in these markets. Hence
market shares are largely determined by consumerstaste rather than di¤erences in price.
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1.1 Literature
Little theoretical work has focused on the mechanisms driving sales concentration within product
assortments. Product di¤erentiation models, for example, cannot readily explain how changes in
the distribution channel or the information structure a¤ect the composition of sales. The search
literature has mainly focused on price dispersion, by considering homogeneous goods o¤ered by
di¤erent sellers. These models are suited for settings where price dominates the search, but provide
no insights on sales concentration across heterogeneous products. Some instances have explored
heterogeneous consumer preferences with location models, such as Bakos [6]. But in this case the
equilibrium is symmetric for all consumer types and sellers, and no sales concentration is predicted
by the model.
Recent work related to the long tail debate has proposed several factors that may explain
sales concentration. Brynjolfsson et al. [7] present a search model with advertising. Consumers
arrive to the market informed about advertised products, but incur search costs to learn about
the remaining. Sales concentration depends on how the size of the advertised and non-advertised
product pools compare. Product popularity information is analyzed in an experiment by Salganik
et al. [17]. They study demand concentration over a set of rare songs o¤ered to test subjects on
the Internet, with some treatments including popularity feedback and others not. They nd that
popularity information increases both concentration and the unpredictability of popularity in the
outcome. Tucker and Zhang [19] analyze a dataset containing the click-through rates of a webpage
indexing marriage agencies, both when popularity is reported to users and when it is not. They
nd that both concentration and consumer participation increase when popularity information is
provided. However, it is unclear to what extent advertising and product popularity information can
explain lower sales concentration. Since these factors have been shown to increase concentration,
a reduction in concentration would require consumers to be less exposed to both, making for an
unclear case in the online channel.
More closely related to the mechanisms explored here, Fleder and Hosanagar [13] analyze the
impact of recommender systems on sales concentration. In their analytical model, they consider
consumers that arrive sequentially to the market and realize random purchases or follow product
recommendations given an exogenous probability. The recommender system implements a popu-
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larity rule, recommending the bestselling product based on the purchases of past consumers, and
they show that the process tends to increase the concentration of sales. As a result, the treatment
is somewhat akin to providing product popularity information. Unlike our approach, it does not
account for the underlying preferences of consumers nor their incentives to engage in word of mouth
processes and follow recommendations.2
Our approach focuses on the demand for recommendations and their impact on sales, and
we assume that recommendations are readily supplied by informed consumers in the market. A
large body of literature has documented several motivations for consumers to contribute to word
of mouth processes, see Dellarocas [10] for a related discussion. Avery et al. [5] explore reward
mechanisms for the optimal provision of recommendations. In our model, consumers providing
recommendations derive no direct benet (nor cost) in the process, but benet indirectly from
lower prices. Although consumers demanding recommendations are willing to reward those that
provide them, we do not further explore this dimension of the problem. Casual evidence suggests
that recommendations are well provisioned in the markets considered here. Consumers may enjoy
the opportunity to discuss their preferred entertainment products with others. The existence of
such positive network e¤ects on the demand side of artistic markets was proposed by Adler [1] and
may well o¤set any bargaining opportunity.
Artistic markets exhibit highly concentrated sales distributions with a minority of bestselling
titles. The phenomenon is widely acknowledged in music, cinema and books, and has sometimes
been referred to as hit culture. A series of papers in the economics literature have analyzed these
markets, pioneered by Rosens [16] famous superstars model as well as later contributions, such as
MacDonald [14]. This literature has, for the most part, explained the phenomena by assuming a
dispersion of talent among producers; greater talent commands higher prots and market shares
than lesser talent. While this approach provides valuable insights on artistic markets, it is unclear
that talent alone can explain the distribution of sales. Consumers generally acknowledge that
di¤erences in talent are important, yet they have a hard time describing what denes talent or
evaluating it. Artistic quality may not be measurable independently of taste. Producers widely
2Additional results are provided with simulations where consumers and products are located on a 2-axis space.
In this setting, the recommender model is richer and consumer preferences are well dened. In most of the scenarios
considered, concentration tends to increase.
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recognized as talented do not appeal to all consumers, while lesser talented artists generally have
a niche audience of followers. Our analysis suggests that mainstream appeal and the added e¤ects
of search costs may well be an alternative route to stardom.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section introduces the building blocks of our
search model. In Section 3 we start with the simplest instance of search, where there is no word
of mouth and consumers cannot evaluate products before purchase. We then proceed to enrich
search strategies in steps to isolate their impact on the market. In Section 3.1 we introduce
evaluations and allow consumers to learn the utility they derive from products before purchasing
them. Starting in Section 4 we introduce word of mouth in the model, and let consumers seek
product recommendations from others. In Section 4.1 we analyze the impact of taste matching on
the word of mouth process. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a market where a monopolist supplies an assortment of horizontally di¤erentiated prod-
ucts. The assortment consists of a continuum of product varieties of measure one. The monopolist
quotes a common price p for all products in the assortment and incurs a transaction cost t per unit
sold. The single price restriction implies that the monopolist cannot price discriminate consumers
or products, and will allow us to isolate demand-side e¤ects driving sales concentration.3
In this market there is a unit mass of consumers. Preferences over products are simplied to a
binary classication; a consumer may derive positive utility from a product or not. In the rst case,
the consumer derives utility u from consumption. In the second case, the consumer derives zero
utility from the product. Consumers exhibit unit demand, and although they may derive utility
from several products they will only consume one.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their product preferences, and we take the view that the most
signicant di¤erence across consumers is their selection of preferred products. In particular, we
assume that all consumers agree on some products, which exhibit universal appeal, but di¤er in
their remaining subset of preferred products. We consider T  3 consumer types, and partition the
3Price dispersion may allow prices to signal product appeal to consumers, enabling consumer search strategies
based on the informational content of prices. Our model is better suited to a scenario where prices are not informative.
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product space into N = T +1 product pools. We let consumers of type t prefer products pertaining
to product pools t and N . So products in pool N are mass market products, while products in
pools t 2 (1; T ) appeal only to a subset of the population. For simplicity, we assume that product
pools are of equivalent size, so the measure of each product pool within the product space is 1=N .
We will refer to T as a measure of taste fragmentation, since the larger the value of T , the more
di¤erentiated the product space is for consumers. It is important to stress that the purpose of this
partition is to dene preferences, and there is no discernible product characteristic that allows an
uninformed consumer to identify product pools within the assortment.
The analysis is of interest when consumer types di¤er in their prevalence in the population,
and we denote by st the share of consumers of type t. Without loss of generality, we order types
in increasing prevalence, where s1 < s2::: < sT . Thus consumer types become mainstream in t (or
less niche), as their preferences are more widespread in the population.
When entering the market, consumers observe the level of prices p and taste fragmentation in the
population, T . However, they arrive uninformed about products and cannot identify their preferred
products within the assortment. All products are ex-ante identical, and as a result consumers face
a search problem in order to locate a preferred product.
A consumer can become informed about products by sampling them. A product match is
achieved when a preferred product is identied. Sampling products is costly, and we let sampling
costs be uniformly distributed in the consumer population independently of product preferences,
where the cost of consumer i is given by ci  U [0; c]. Thus sampling a product which does not yield
a match incurs disutility ci, and sampling and consuming a product match yields utility u   ci.
Consumers always incur a sampling cost before deriving utility from a product. For experience
goods, this can be understood as the time investment required to experience the good.
Consumers form a rational expectation of their participation costs in the market. Participation
costs have two components: the search costs to locate a match and the price to be paid for the
desired product. Consumers may participate in the market to purchase and consume a preferred
product or remain out. Utility of the outside option is normalized to zero.
To summarize our model:
 There are N = T + 1 product pools in the assortment, and all products are priced at p.
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 There are T consumer types, and consumers of type t derive utility u from products in pools
t and N , and zero from the remaining.
 The share of consumers of type t in the population is given by st, where st < st+1.
 Sampling costs are uniformly distributed in the consumer population, ci  U [0; c].
The search problem is solved assuming uniform sampling from the product space. This is
consistent with the fact that products are ex-ante identical for consumers. We assume sampling
costs in the consumer population c are su¢ ciently high to avoid corner solutions in the pricing
game, ensuring a positive mass of consumers does not to participate in equilibrium and the market
remains uncovered.4 All games are solved by backwards induction.
We refer to search costs as the average cost incurred by participating consumers to locate a
product match in the market. We will show that search costs and the demand for each product
pool (or the products contained therein) depend on the search strategies available to consumers.
A sales distribution assigns to each product pool a market share, which is obtained by dividing
demand for that pool over the aggregate demand across all pools. When analyzing the impact of
di¤erent search strategies on the market, the sales distribution allows us to isolate variations in the
concentration of sales (or market share variations) from volume e¤ects driven by shifts in consumer
participation.
To analyze variations in the concentration of sales across sales distributions, we require only
the following property. Consider an ordering of product pools in decreasing market share order,
such that the product pool with rank 1 has the highest market share and the rank N pool has
the lowest. A market share transfer from a low rank pool to a higher rank pool that preserves the
ranks reduces concentration. Conversely, a rank-preserving transfer from high to low rank pools
increases concentration. All concentration indexes in the literature satisfy this property, including
for example the Gini index.
Finally, consider the impact of a concentration shift on the sales distribution. A rank-preserving
transfer that reduces concentration by increasing the market shares of high rank pools implies a
growth in the tail of the distribution (loosely dened). We denote such transfer as a long tail e¤ect.
4This requires c > 1
2
(u   t   r) throughout our analysis, where r is the cost of seeking a recommendation as
introduced in Section 4.
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3 Search with no word of mouth
We start with the simplest instance of our model, the case in which there is no word of mouth and
consumers cannot evaluate products prior to purchase. In this setting, consumers can only become
informed about products by purchasing them. With this approach, we can analyze the impact of
evaluations prior to purchase by separately introducing them in the next Section. While consumers
stand to benet from evaluating products before purchasing them, note that their ability to do so is
largely under the monopolists control, for instance by setting retail policies or publishing product
previews. The impact of evaluations is of interest because it has been suggested that improved
exploration in the online channel, provided for instance by book excerpts or audio clips, could
generate a long tail e¤ect.
Consider the following two-stage game without evaluations. In the rst stage, the monopolist
chooses the price level in the market, p. In the second stage, consumers may search for a match
by sequentially drawing and purchasing products from the assortment. Consumers incur price p
and sampling cost ci on each draw. Product evaluations prior to purchase are not allowed, so
consumers can only sample and become informed about products by purchasing them rst. The
following graph depicts the sequential search process faced by consumers:
Draw
product
Purchase Sample Match?
No
Yes
Consume
Consumer search strategy. Consider the search problem faced by consumers in the second
stage given a price level p. The only feasible search strategy is to sequentially purchase and sample
products until a match is located. Denote by  the match probability for a consumer on each draw.
A consumer of type t will only obtain a product match when drawing a product from pools t or
N . Since products are drawn uniformly from the assortment, the probability of drawing from any
given pool is 1=N . Hence,
 =
2
N
; (1)
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and each purchase is a Bernoulli trial with success probability , which is common for all consumers.
The expected utility of a new purchase for a consumer i with sampling cost ci is
uis = u  ci   p; (2)
given that utility u is only derived with probability  but price p and sampling cost ci are incurred
on each purchase. The expected utility of a purchase does not depend on a consumers type, but
will vary across consumers depending on their sampling cost ci. The utility of a successive draw,
however, is constant throughout the search for any given consumer. Hence a consumer either
searches until a match is obtained or does not participate in the market. We can identify the
consumer of each type which is strictly indi¤erent between both alternatives by equating uis to
zero. Denote this indi¤erent consumer by cis,
cis = u  p: (3)
Only consumers with a sampling cost ci  cis choose to search, and participation is homogeneous
across types. Consumers with a higher sampling cost prefer not to participate in the market. The
search process for any consumer nalizes once a match is located; searching for a second match
cannot be optimal given that product prices are homogeneous and search is costly.
Sales concentration. We next characterize the distribution of sales across products. A
participating consumer may purchase several non-preferred products until a match is located, due
to failed draws during her search, but will only purchase a single preferred product. Denote by Dp
and Dnp a consumers expected demand for preferred and non-preferred product pools respectively.
The probability of purchasing a non-preferred product on each draw is given by 1   . The
probability of purchasing j non-preferred products before purchasing a preferred product is given
by (1   )j. If we consider all possible search histories, and given that each consumers has two
preferred product pools,
Dp =
1
2
P1
j=0(1  )j =
1
2
. (4)
11
And since there are N   2 non-preferred product pools, the expected demand for each of these
pools is
Dnp =
1
N   2
P1
j=0 j(1  )j =
1
2
. (5)
So Dp = Dnp, and each participating consumers demand for preferred and non-preferred prod-
ucts pools coincides. Hence the sales distribution is uniform, and the concentration of sales is
minimum.
Firm pricing. We next turn to the rst stage of the game and solve the rms problem.
The consumer participation constraint for all types (3) is a function of price level p. Note that
for the rm to sustain positive prices and face demand, so that cis > 0, we require t < u. If
the monopolists transaction costs are high or taste is very fragmented (high T ), then t  u and
no feasible transaction is protable, so the market breaks down. We need only consider the case
where t < u. Given that search is a Bernoulli process and each trial has success probability , the
expected number of purchases a consumer requires for a match is  1. So consumers of all types
with ci  cis participate in the market and each consumer executes  1 purchases on average. Firm
prots given the aggregate demand for all product pools are
s =
cis
c
 1(p  t) = (u   p)(p  t)
c
: (6)
Solving for the rms optimal price we obtain
ps =
u + t
2
: (7)
Social welfare. We next derive social welfare SWs, dened as the sum of consumer surplus
and rm surplus. Every participating consumer generates social surplus u net of the transaction
and sampling costs involved in the search. Since every consumer purchases on average  1 products
to locate a match,
SWs =
cis
c
(u   1t) 
Z cis
0
 1cidci: (8)
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Proposition 1 When consumers cannot evaluate products prior to purchase, the distribution of
sales is uniform and sales concentration is minimum. Furthermore, the market breaks down if
transaction costs are high or taste is very fragmented.
As shown by this rst result, all product pools enjoy an equal market share when no product
evaluations prior to purchase are allowed. Due to the unsuccessful purchases incurred by consumers
to locate a match, every participating consumer exhibits uniform demand (in expectation) over all
product pools. If product pools that appealed to no consumer were present in the assortment, they
would enjoy an equal market share to the rest. Thus market shares are not informative of consumer
preferences.
Demand is downward sloping in prices, as expected. Consumers anticipate the costs of locating
a match, which requires incurring unsuccessful purchases, and do not participate in the market if
it does not pay o¤. The rm recognizes this and discounts prices by , the match probability faced
by consumers on each draw from the assortment, which determines their willingness to participate.
In addition, when taste is very fragmented or transaction costs are high, the market breaks down.
In these cases, no protable price for the monopolist faces positive demand in the market. Similar
ndings were reported by Bakos [6] in a search model with horizontally di¤erentiated products.
3.1 Evaluations
We next consider the two-stage game with product evaluations prior to purchase. In the rst stage,
the monopolist chooses the price level in the market, p. In the second stage, consumers may search
for a match by sequentially drawing and sampling products from the assortment. Since consumers
can sample products before purchase, they incur sampling cost ci on each draw but will only execute
a purchase at price p when they locate a match. Note that consumers strictly prefer to sample
products before purchase whenever possible, as this avoids unsuccessful purchases.5 Consumers
now face the following sequential search process:
5Our model of evaluations is equivalent to a market where consumers can realize costless returns before consump-
tion.
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Draw
product
PurchaseSample Match?
No
Yes
Consume
Consumer search strategy. Consider the consumers problem in the second stage given a
price level p. The probability of a match when drawing and sampling a product is given by . The
expected utility of a new product evaluation for an unmatched consumer is
uie = (u  p)  ci; (9)
given that consumers only purchase if a match is located but incur sampling cost ci on every
draw. The expected utility does not depend on a consumers type, but will vary across consumers
depending on their sampling cost. The utility of a successive draw, however, is constant throughout
the search for any given consumer. Hence we can identify the consumer of each type which is strictly
indi¤erent between evaluating products and not participating by equating uie to zero. We denote
the indi¤erent evaluator by cie,
cie = (u  p): (10)
Only consumers with a sampling cost ci  cie choose to search, and participation is homogeneous
across types. Consumers with a higher sampling cost prefer not to participate in the market. The
search process for any consumer nalizes once a match is located; searching for a second match
cannot be optimal.
Sales concentration. Next we characterize the sales distribution with evaluations, denoted
by . Let ste be the share of consumers of type t among the mass of consumers that search with
evaluations. We proceed by characterizing separately the sales distribution generated by each
consumer type t, where n =
P
t s
t
e
t
n.
To characterize t, note that consumers only purchase when they locate a product match, so
the sales distribution generated by consumer of type t must equal their distribution of matches
over products. Note that all consumers of type t are identically and independently distributed in
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the sampling outcome, as every product evaluation is independent of past evaluations and those of
other consumers. Thus t is independent of the market participation of consumers of type t, and
we can derive t by characterizing the distribution of matches over products for a single evaluation
of a consumer of type t. To do so, it is useful to dene indicator function  based on consumer
preferences. Let tn = 1 if n = t or n = N , and 
t
n = 0 otherwise. The probability that a consumer
of type t matches product n is equal to (1=N)tn, and the probability of a match over all products
is given by . This implies
tn =
(1=N)tn

=
8><>:
1
2 if n = t or n = N
0 otherwise
(11)
We can now derive ,
n =
X
t
ste
t
n =
8><>:
ste
2 if n 2 (1; N   1)
1
2 if n = N
(12)
And since participation is homogeneous across all consumer types, ste = s
t and the market
share of product pools is increasing in n. Hence introducing evaluations prior to purchase strictly
increases the concentration of sales in the market.
Firm pricing. We next turn to the rms problem given the consumer participation constraint
for all types (10). Given that every participating consumer now purchases only once, rm prots
are
e =
cie
c
(p  t) = (u  p)(p  t)
c
: (13)
Solving for the rms optimal price we obtain
pe =
u+ t
2
: (14)
Social welfare. We next derive social welfare with evaluations, SWe. Every participating
consumer generates social surplus u net of transaction cost t and sampling costs, and each consumer
samples on average  1 products to locate a match,
15
SWe =
cie
c
(u  t) 
Z cie
0
 1ci dci: (15)
It is easy to show that social welfare is higher with evaluations as long as sampling costs in
the population are low, that is SWe > SWs if and only if c  4. In particular, rm prots are
always higher with evaluations, e > s, but the impact of evaluations on consumer surplus is only
positive as long as c  2.
Proposition 2 Evaluations prior to purchase increase the concentration of sales in the market.
Evaluations also reduce consumer search costs and avoid market break down. Firm prots, prices
and consumer participation increase, but the e¤ect on consumer surplus is only positive if sampling
costs are low. Lowering sampling costs increases both rm prots and consumer surplus.
Evaluations allow consumers to purchase only products they match with, and this increases
the concentration of sales in the market. The increase is driven by the fact that product pools
di¤er in their appeal to the consumer population. Therefore, when sales are realized by informed
consumers, there is a market share shift from pools that appeal to a small share of the population
to those that appeal to a larger share, benetting mass market products the most.
Thus evaluations prior to purchase do not generate a long tail e¤ect. Although evaluations
have been proposed to reduce sales concentration by driving increased product exploration, our
analysis suggests otherwise. The explanation is simple: consumer participation increases with
evaluations, but consumers no longer purchase products they do not match with and this increases
the concentration of sales. With independence of the concentration shift, however, evaluations can
increase the sales volume of all products in the assortment. This case arises when the participation
increase is very large, in particular when taste is fragmented (implying a low ) or transaction costs
t are high.
The impact of evaluations on the rms demand is driven by two e¤ects: (1) more consumers
ready to participate at every price level, since evaluations reduce search costs by ensuring there are
no unsuccessful purchases, and (2) every participating consumer now realizes a unique purchase
once a match is located. These e¤ects rotate the demand curve, expanding demand in the higher
price range and contracting it in the lower range. As a result, the rm no longer discounts prices
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by , as there are no unsuccessful purchases, and prices with evaluations are higher. Firm prots
are strictly higher with evaluations, but consumer surplus only increases when sampling costs in
the population are low. When sampling costs are high, evaluations allow the rm to appropriate a
higher share of consumer surplus, and consumers are worse o¤.
Evaluations may be costly for the rm if additional resources or infrastructure are required.
When transaction costs are high or taste is fragmented, t < u, evaluations enable markets that
would otherwise break down due to unsuccessful purchases. In these cases, the rm has strong
incentives to implement evaluations. But the protability of evaluations decreases quickly when
taste becomes less fragmented, as  ! 1 and consumers incur few unsuccessful purchases with-
out evaluations. Hence we should expect evaluations to be implemented when consumer taste is
fragmented. The rms incentives to implement evaluations also increase with match utility u and
decrease with sampling costs c, as higher sampling costs reduce market participation.
The above suggests that the rm has incentives to lower consumers sampling costs. Casual
evidence suggests that rms invest in doing so. Many bookstores, for example, provide a com-
fortable environment and cafeteria services for their customers to browse books. Online retailers
invest in the infrastructure required to stream book excerpts, song clips and movie trailers to their
customers. According to our model, this provides incentives for more consumers to search within
the assortment, allowing the rm to sustain higher prices and increase prots.
4 Search with word of mouth
In this Section we introduce word of mouth by adding a third stage to the game. In the rst stage,
the monopolist chooses the price level in the market, p. Consumers willing to participate then
choose between two available search strategies. In the second stage, as in the previous Section,
consumers may search for a match with evaluations by sequentially drawing and sampling products
from the assortment. In the third stage, consumers may search for a match by seeking recommen-
dations from those that searched before them in the second stage. Instead of drawing products
from the product space, consumers searching with recommendations draw product references from
the mass of consumers that searched with evaluations. A consumer drawn to provide a recom-
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mendation identies the product she matched with.6 The consumer seeking recommendations may
then draw and sample the identied product at cost ci. The sequential search process when seeking
recommendations is as follows:
Draw product
recommendation
PurchaseSample
product
Match?
No
Yes
Consume
Recommendations are drawn uniformly from the mass of consumers that searched with evalua-
tions, which ensures that they are representative of the evaluating populations preferences. Each
recommendation draw incurs a xed cost r, since an additional step in the search is required to
obtain information from others. To ensure that recommendations hold in the market, we need to
assume r < (u  t)=4 . Consumers providing recommendations freely identify their product match,
and we will show that in doing so they benet from lower prices.7
We also assume consumers form a correct expectation of the share of evaluating consumers of
their type, ste. In equilibrium, this determines their match probability with recommendations, as it
captures how probable it is to obtain a recommendation from someone who shares their preferences.
Past search experience, for example, can enable consumers to correctly forecast the value they derive
from word of mouth.
Consumer search strategy. Consider the problem of an unmatched consumer in the third
stage when the price level in the market is p. Product recommendations are drawn from the mass of
consumers that searched with evaluations in the second stage. Note that that the sales distribution
generated by evaluating consumers  (12) carries over from our previous analysis, and describes the
distribution of matches over product pools for the mass of evaluating consumers (although ste will
di¤er with word of mouth). The expected probability of a match for a consumer of type t seeking
recommendations, denoted by t, is given by
6The recommendation exchange can be understood to take place either online or o­ ine. In the rst case, sampling
consumers actively publish their recommendations and consumers seeking recommendations browse them. In the
second case, consumers seeking recommendations observe which consumers have already matched and request product
references from them.
7Since consumers seeking recommendations incur a sunk cost r on each draw, they would be willing to reward those
that provide them instead. But assuming r is a sunk cost instead of a transfer allows us to ignore the bargaining
problem that could arise between consumers. See Avery et al. [5] for a mechanism on the optimal provision of
recommendations.
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t = t + N =
1 + ste
2
: (16)
The expression is a function of the share of evaluating consumers of type t. Thus the match
probability when seeking recommendations will di¤er across types. As @t=@ste > 0, the larger the
share of evaluating consumers of a consumers own type, the larger her match probability when
drawing a recommendation. We proceed by assuming that a positive mass of evaluating consumers
of each type exists. Given that ste > 0 and N  4, it can be shown that t >  for all types.
The expected utility of seeking a new recommendation for consumer i of type t is
ut;ir = 
t(u  p)  r   ci; (17)
as every recommendation draw incurs cost r in addition to sampling cost ci. Note that the ut;ir di¤ers
both across types due to t and within types depending on ci. So while seeking recommendations
yields a higher probability of a match on each draw, it is also more costly due to r. The utility of
a successive draw, however, is constant throughout the search for any given consumer. Hence we
can identify the consumer of type t which is strictly indi¤erent between seeking recommendations
and not participating by equating ut;ir to zero. We denote the indi¤erent recommendation seeker of
type t by ct;ir , where
ct;ir = 
t(u  p)  r: (18)
Unmatched consumers of type t with a sampling cost ci  ct;ir choose to search with recommen-
dations in the third stage, and those such that ct;i > ct;ir prefer to stay out of the market.
We next turn to the second stage of the game and analyze the decision to search with evaluations.
As consumers anticipate that they may search with recommendations in the third stage, they
decide which search strategy to pursue (if any) by comparing the expected utility of both. Given
that the number of draws required for a match di¤ers between both strategies, as t >  for all
types, consumers need to evaluate the expected costs incurred to locate a match with both. Note
that this comparison holds at any point of the search process for an unmatched consumer, as the
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expected utility of both search strategies is una¤ected by past search history. This implies that
no consumer that chooses to search with evaluations will abort the search in order to search with
recommendations.
To identify the indi¤erent evaluator of type t, denoted by ct;ie , we equate the expected utility
derived from both search strategies in order to locate a match, ut;ir = uie. Note that u
i
e (9) carries
over from our previous analysis and is type-independent. The expected number of draws required
for a match with evaluations and recommendations are given by 1= and 1=t respectively. The
indi¤erent evaluator of type t is then
u  p  r + c
t;i
e
t
= u  p  c
t;i
e

ct;ie =
r
t    : (19)
Consumers of type t with an evaluation cost ci 2 [0; ct;ie ) prefer to search with evaluations
in the second stage over seeking recommendations. For consistency, we require a positive mass
of consumers of type t to seek recommendations in equilibrium, so ct;ie < c
t;i
r must hold. As c
t;i
r is
decreasing in price level p for each type, we can identify the boundary price pt by equating ct;ie = c
t;i
r ,
pt = u  r
t    : (20)
If no consumers of type t are willing to search with recommendations, consumers of this type
will search only with evaluations and the indi¤erent evaluator of type t is given by ct;ie = cie as in
(10), following our previous analysis. Note that participation is homogeneous across types that
search only with evaluations.
We can now characterize consumers search strategy. If p < pt, consumers of types t with
sampling cost ci 2 [0; ct;ie ) search with evaluations, and those with sampling cost ci 2 [ct;ie ; ct;ir )
seek recommendations. If p  pt, consumers of type t with sampling cost ci 2 [0; cie) search with
evaluations. All remaining consumers stay out of the market.
We next characterize in more detail the composition of search strategies across types. Clearly,
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all types participate in the market, so there is always a positive mass of evaluators of each type. For
those types that search with recommendations, note that ct;ie is given by an implicit equation as t
is a function of ste, which in turn depends on the mass of evaluating consumers of all types, including
the type considered. So the equilibrium participation of types that search with recommendations
is dened by a system of implicit equations, one equation for each type. We next argue that the
solution to this system satises that ct;ie and ste are decreasing and increasing in t, respectively, for
types that search with recommendations. We show this by contradiction.
Assume recommendations hold for two types, t and t+ 1. First, consider the case ct;ie = c
t+1;i
e .
This requires that t = t+1 by (19), which then implies that ste = s
t+1
e by (16). But on the other
hand, since there is a larger share of consumers of type t + 1 in the population, st < st+1 and
ct;ie = c
t+1;i
e both imply ste < s
t+1
e , which is a contradiction. Next, consider the case c
t;i
e < c
t+1;i
e .
This requires that t > t+1 by (19), which implies that ste > s
t+1
e by (16). But in this case
st < st+1 and ct;ie < c
t+1;i
e imply that ste < s
t+1
e , which again is a contradiction. Hence the only
feasible solution must satisfy ct;ie > c
t+1;i
e and ste < s
t+1
e for types t and t+ 1.
We can now draw some conclusions for all types. Among the mass of consumers searching
with evaluations and among the mass of consumers searching with recommendations, the shares of
consumers of type t, denoted by ste and s
t
r respectively, are increasing in t. To be sure, note that
ct;ie is constant across types that search with evaluations only, and that if type t searchers with
recommendations but type t  1 does not, st 1e < ste must hold. So, since ste is increasing in t, then
t must also be increasing in t. The latter implies that ct;ir and pt are increasing in t, so str must
also be increasing in t. Thus, in equilibrium, types with a large population share (higher t) have
more incentives to search with recommendations than types with a low population share (lower t),
and if recommendations hold for type t in equilibrium they must also hold for types j > t.
Sales concentration. We next analyze the impact of word of mouth on sales concentration.
Denote the sales distribution with word of mouth in the market by , and let ster be the share
of consumers of type t among all participating consumers (with subindex er to denote that this
includes both consumers searching with evaluations and recommendations). We argue that the
introduction of word of mouth increases the concentration of sales, and show this in two steps.
Consider the sales distribution in the market with evaluations only,  (12). To analyze how 
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di¤ers from , we rst account for the shift in consumer participation driven by word of mouth
while keeping xed the per-type sales distribution (the participation e¤ect). In doing so, we derive
a participation-adjusted sales distribution , where n =
P
t s
t
er
t
n. In the second step, we account
for the change in the sales distribution generated by consumers seeking recommendations (the
mass market e¤ect) to obtain , where n =
P
t s
t
er
t
n and 
t is the sales distribution generated by
consumers of type t in the market.
To account for the participation shift, we can directly write  using t (11),
n =
X
t
ster
t
n =
8><>:
ster
2 if n < N
1
2 if n = N
: (21)
To see how  di¤ers from , denote the marginal type that searches with recommendations by
tr, such that types t < tr search only with evaluations and types t  tr search with both evaluations
and recommendations. We have established that participation is homogeneous for types t < tr and
given by cie, while participation for types t  tr is given by ct;ir , where ct;ir   ct;ie > 0 and increasing
in t. So ster is constant for types t < t
r, and larger and increasing in t for types t  tr. Inspection of
 (21) and  (12) reveals that this implies: (1) a market share transfer from product pools n < tr
to pools n 2 (tr; T ), and (2) a market share transfer from pool n to pool n + 1 within product
pools n 2 (tr; T ). Since both transfers shift market share from low to high ranked product pools
according to sales rank, the participation shift unambiguously increases concentration.
We next account for the shift in the per-type sales distribution generated by recommendation
seekers. Note that t can be decomposed into sales driven by consumers of type t searching with
evaluations, t, and those searching with recommendations, which we denote by t (which is only
dened for consumer types that search with recommendations). To characterize the shift we next
analyze how t di¤ers from t.
To characterize t, note that every recommendation draw is independent from past draws, so all
consumers of type t seeking recommendations are identically and independently distributed. Thus
t is independent of the mass of consumers of type t seeking recommendations, and we need only
characterize the distribution of matches for a single recommendation draw. The probability that
a consumer of type t matches with product pool n when drawing a recommendation is given by
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tnn, and the probability of a match over all products is given by 
t. This implies
tn =
n
t
n
t
=
8>>>><>>>>:
ste
1+ste
if n = t
1
1+ste
if n = N
0 otherwise
(22)
Note that tt < 1=2 and 
t
N > 1=2, so 
t di¤ers from t in that tt < 
t
t and 
t
N > 
t
N . Since
this implies a transfer from low to high ranked product pools according to sales rank, the sales
distribution shift generated by recommendation seekers unambiguously increases concentration.
Thus we conclude that word of mouth strictly increases the concentration of sales in the market.
Firm pricing. We next turn to the rst stage of the game and analyze the rms pricing
problem. Given a price level p in the market, we have established that only types t such that p < pt
search with recommendations. So the number of consumer types that search with recommendations
decreases (in a step-wise fashion) with prices, and if prices are su¢ ciently high, p  pT , no types
search with recommendations. Let tr be the marginal type seeking recommendations given p, such
that pt
r 1  p < ptr (recall that pt is increasing in t). Firm prots can be written as
r = [
Xtr 1
t=1
cie
c
st +
XT
t=tr
ctr
c
st](p  t): (23)
The rms demand curve is composed of T + 1 linear components, is continuous, (non-strictly)
convex, and non-di¤erentiable at pt for t 2 (1; T ). Each component of the demand curve describes
a concave prot curve. Each prot curve lies above the rest in its own price range, and intersects
with the curves of neighboring ranges at the price points pt that separate components.
Dene bt as the following population-weighted match probability given the search strategies
across of types when tr = t,
bt = PTt=tr stPtr 1
t=1 s
t +
PT
t=tr
stt
; (24)
where bt > 0. For each component of demand such that tr 2 (1; T ) we can derive the maximum of
the corresponding prot curve from (23), denoted by bpt, where
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bpt = u+ t  rbt
2
. (25)
For the component in which tr = T +1, consumers search only with evaluations and bpT+1 = pe
as in (14).
To identify the prot maximizing solution pr, the rm need only evaluate prots at well dened
maximums. Given the component-linearity and convexity of the demand curve, it follows that bpt
is increasing in t (so bt must be decreasing in t). Well dened maximums are those such that
pt 1  bpt < pt. In addition, whenever multiple maximums are well dened, it follows that they
pertain to contiguous ranges. Our restriction on r ensures that the rms solution falls in the range
pr < p
T and recommendations hold in equilibrium for some consumer types.8
Social welfare. With respect to the solution with no word of mouth derived in Section 3.1,
whenever recommendations hold in equilibrium for some consumer types we have established that:
(1) consumer participation is higher, and (2) prices are lower. This implies that word of mouth
strictly increases rm prots and consumers surplus, unambiguously increasing social welfare.
Proposition 3 Word of mouth increases the concentration of sales in the market. Word of mouth
also reduces consumer search costs, benets consumers with widespread preferences the most, and
increases in value with the fragmentation of taste. Firm prots and consumer surplus increase with
higher consumer participation and lower product prices. Lowering the cost of recommendations
intensies the previous e¤ects.
Word of mouth arises endogenously, and the exchange of product information between con-
sumers reduces search costs in the market. Word of mouth allows consumers to benet from those
that searched before them, increasing the probability of a match by gathering information about
which products to sample. The value of word of mouth increases with the fragmentation of taste.
The higher the fragmentation, the lower the match probability when sampling products from the as-
sortment. This renders the match probability with recommendations more attractive, in particular
8This requires that the maximum for the component without word of mouth is not well dened, bpT+1 < pT , which
implies r < 1
2
(u  t)(T   ). Given that in equilibrium T > (1+ 1=T )=2 and  = 2=(T +1), it follows that T   
is increasing in T and LimT!1 T    = 1=2. So r < (u   t)=4 is su¢ cient to ensure word of mouth holds in
equilibrium.
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given the high probability of identifying a mass market product.
Consumers with low sampling costs prefer to search with evaluations, as recommendations
are costly, while those with high sampling costs are better o¤ searching with recommendations.
Consumers seeking recommendations, however, cannot observe the preferences of those providing
them, so recommendations end up being exchanged in the market between consumers with di¤erent
product preferences. This cross-type exchange has an asymmetric impact across consumer types
and across product pools. We decompose the impact in two e¤ects, a mass market e¤ect and a
participation e¤ect.
The mass market e¤ect follows from the fact that all consumers agree on mass market products.
Consumers seeking recommendations are more likely to match with mass market products than
those searching with evaluations, as successful cross-type recommendation can only yield a match
with these products. This e¤ect increases the market share of mass market products.
The participation e¤ect is driven by the fact that some product preferences are more widespread
in the consumer population. In equilibrium, more recommendations originate from consumers with
widespread preferences, as a larger mass of these consumers choose to search with evaluations.
Thus the benet consumers derive from word of mouth increases with the prevalence of their taste
in the population. As a result, consumers with widespread preferences exhibit higher participation,
and a higher share of them search with recommendations. On the other hand, word of mouth may
not pay o¤ for consumers with uncommon preferences if their share in the population is su¢ ciently
low, and those consumers may search only with evaluations. This e¤ect increases the market shares
of product pools with widespread appeal and decreases that of pools with low appeal.
Both the mass market and the participation e¤ect increase the concentration of sales, and the
shift in concentration grows with the share of consumers searching with recommendations. Hence
word of mouth does not generate a long tail e¤ect. On the contrary, products enjoy increasing
returns to appealing to a larger share of the consumer population, reinforcing their market shares.
As a result, market shares overestimate the appeal of best-selling products and underestimate that
of lesser performing products. The result is reminiscent of the double jeopardy e¤ect discussed by
Ehrenberg et al. [11], where small brands perform comparatively worse than large brands. Our
model suggests that word of mouth could be an explanatory factor for such e¤ects.
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The result is robust. We have considered positive recommendations only, as negative recom-
mendations have no value in the market. For a consumer, following a negative recommendation
and discarding a single product from the assortment does not increase the probability of locating
a match. The result carries over to discrete product spaces, where it can be shown that the in-
formational value of negative recommendations quickly decreases with the size of the assortment.
Presumably for this reason, we do not observe consumers seeking recommendations on what to
dislike within large assortments.
We have assumed recommendations enjoy no salience, as consumers do not place additional
value on a match that results from a recommendation. Senecal and Nantel [18] report a series of
experiments that suggest recommendations have an inuential e¤ect on consumers beyond aware-
ness. In our framework, salient recommendations would increase the expected utility consumers
derive from recommendations ut;ir , increasing consumer participation and the share of consumers
searching with recommendations. Hence salience would reinforce the increase in concentration.
Our model is also static. If we considered a dynamic model of consumer arrival where rec-
ommendations originated, at any point in time, from all consumers that arrived earlier (not only
those that searched with evaluations) sales concentration would only increase. In this scenario,
recommendations originating from consumers that previously matched seeking recommendations
themselves would further reinforce the mass market and participation e¤ects. Such a dynamic
model could approximate the ndings on popularity feedback reported by Salganik et al. [17] and
Tucker and Zhang [19].
For the rm, word of mouth expands demand in the low price range. Word of mouth does not
hold in the high price range, as consumers seeking recommendations are those with high sampling
costs and their willingness to participate is lower than that of consumers searching with evaluations.
As a result, the rm discounts prices to account for the value of recommendations in the market
and word of mouth holds in equilibrium. The share of participating consumers that seek recom-
mendations increases with consumption utility u and the fragmentation of taste T , and decreases
with recommendation cost r. With respect to the market with no word of mouth, equilibrium
prices are lower and participation is higher. Social welfare is unambiguously higher, as both rm
prots and consumer surplus increase. All consumers, including those searching with evaluations,
26
benet from word of mouth.
Similarly to lowering sampling costs for consumers, facilitating the exchange of recommendations
by lowering their cost has the potential to expand markets. This provides incentives for the rm to
play an active role in the process, an opportunity fueled by the online environment. Online retailers
such as Amazon have designed platforms to facilitate the exchange of product recommendations,
becoming valuable resources for consumers. Chevalier and Mayzlin [9] analyze the impact of online
book reviews at two major online retailers. They nd that most reviews are overwhelmingly positive
and increase the relative sales at the retailer they are posted on. The ndings are consistent with
our model, and suggest that part of the market growth spurred by electronic commerce may be
attributable to word of mouth alone.
4.1 Taste matching
Our analysis has shown that word of mouth arises endogenously and creates value in the market,
but has also revealed the existence of ine¢ cient recommendation exchanges between consumers with
di¤erent preferences. Consumers stand to benet from matching with others of their same type in
the word of mouth exchange, as this would increase their match probability with recommendations,
and we have argued that the Internet has signicantly increased their ability to do so. To this end,
we next analyze the impact of taste matching on the market. We build on the same setup and
timing as in the previous Section, but introduce an exogenous mechanism that allows consumers
seeking recommendations to obtain them from those that share their product preferences.
Consumer search strategy. With taste matching, recommendations always yield a match
since they are exchanged only between consumers of the same type. Therefore t = 1 for all t,
and the match probability with recommendations no longer depends on the composition of types
among evaluating consumers. Note that we require a positive mass of evaluating consumers of each
type to provide recommendations in the market, and we proceed by assuming this is the case.
The impact of taste matching on the market follows from our analysis in the previous Section
taking into account that t = 1. This homogenizes across types the utility of recommendations
ut;ir (17), the indi¤erent recommendation seeker c
t;i
r (18), the indi¤erent evaluator c
t;i
e (19), and the
boundary recommendation price pt. To account for the fact that they no longer depend on t, we
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denote them by uir, c
i
r, c
i
e, and p respectively.
If prices are above the boundary recommendation price, p  p, all types search only with
evaluations and the market conguration is equivalent to that of Section 3.1. If p < p, all types
search with recommendations. In this case 0 < cie < c
i
r holds for all types, and there is a positive
mass of consumers of each type willing to search with evaluations. This also implies that ste = s
t
r =
ster = s
t, and participation is homogeneous across types.
Sales concentration. We next argue that the introduction of taste matching reduces sales
concentration. Consider the participation shift, given by  in (21). Since ster = s
t
e with taste
matching,  =  and the participation shift does not alter concentration with respect to evalua-
tions. Next, consider the sales distribution shift generated by recommendation seekers. With taste
matching, consumers only draw recommendations from evaluating consumers of their own type, so
t is now given by
tn =
tn
t
n
t
= tn: (26)
This implies that t = t, and recommendation seekers do not alter concentration with respect
to evaluations. We conclude that  =  and sales concentration with taste matching is equivalent
to that derived in Section 3.1 with evaluations only.
Firm pricing. The rms prot function r (23) carries over by taking into account that there
is now a unique non-di¤erentiability at p. The demand curve has two linear components; either
p  p and tr = T + 1, or p < p and tr = 1. The maximum of the prot curve in the range p < p is
given by
ptm =
u+ t  r
2
, (27)
since b1 = 1 given that t = 1 for all types (we need only consider the case tr = 1 in the range
p < p). The rms prot maximizing price is ptm, given that our restriction on r ensures that
ptm < p.9
9The maximum of the prot curve in the range p  p is given by pe in (14). For the solution to be in the range
p < p we require that pe < p, which implies r < 12 (u t)(1 ). This always holds given our assumption r < (u t)=4.
In addition, this equilibrium marks the highest consumer participation predicted in the model. For the market to
remain uncovered in equilibrium, we require cir < c, which given ptm implies c >
1
2
(u  t  r). This lower boundary
on c ensures the market is uncovered in all equilibria derived in our analysis.
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Social welfare. With respect to word of mouth in the previous Section, consumer participation
increases in the price range p < p, unambiguously increasing rm prots in equilibrium.
The impact of taste matching on consumer surplus is extremely complex to characterize, un-
fortunately. Taste matching reduces search costs for consumers, but in addition may increase or
decrease prices, rendering the net e¤ect on consumer surplus ambiguous. To illustrate this, consider
consumer surplus in the market when taking  and  as exogenous,
CWtm =
cir
c
u 
Z cie
0
 1ci dci  
Z cir
cie
 1(ci + r) dci: (28)
In this scenario, prices are increasing in , and it can be shown that @CWtm=@ < 0 if sampling
costs c are su¢ ciently high.
The impact on consumer surplus in our model is more complex, as  and  di¤er across types
in the word of mouth equilibrium, and the sign and intensity of the price change depends on bt (24)
in word of mouth prices pr. Thus ptm < pr and ptm > pr are possible. Due to the complexity of bt
we are unable to pin down the exact behavior of prices in order to draw clear-cut conclusions, but
the above suggests that consumer surplus will increase whenever bt or sampling costs c are low.
Proposition 4 Taste matching generates a long tail e¤ect, reducing the concentration of sales in
the market. Taste matching also reduces search costs, increasing the value of recommendations for
all consumers and beneting those with uncommon preferences the most. Firm prots increase due
to higher consumer participation, but the impact on prices and consumer surplus is ambiguous.
Taste matching ensures recommendations are exchanged only between consumers that share
the same product preferences. This implies that recommendations always yield a product match,
becoming more valuable for consumers and reducing search costs in the market. In fact, the value
consumers derive from recommendations no longer depends on how prevalent their preferences are
in the population, so consumers with widespread preferences no longer enjoy an advantage over
their peers. Thus consumers with uncommon preferences benet the most from taste matching,
and since there is no longer an asymmetric benet across the consumer population, participation
becomes homogeneous across types.
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By eliminating the cross-type exchange of recommendations, taste matching generates a long
tail e¤ect and reduces the concentration of sales in the market. To see this, consider the e¤ects
driving concentration with word of mouth. On the one hand, there is no longer a mass market e¤ect.
As there are no cross-type recommendations, consumers seeking recommendations no longer have
a higher probability of matching with mass market products than matching with the remaining of
their preferred products. This shifts market share from mass market products to all other product
pools with respect to word of mouth. On the other hand, there is no longer a participation e¤ect.
Again, since there are no cross-type recommendations, consumers with widespread preferences no
longer derive higher value from recommendations than others and do not participate comparatively
more in the market. This shifts market share from products that appeal to a large share of the
population to those that appeal to a lower share. As a result, taste matching reverses the increase
in concentration driven by word of mouth, and sales concentration is now equivalent to that derived
in Section 3.1 with evaluations only.
Taste matching expands the rms demand in the low price range. More consumers are now
ready to participate by seeking recommendations in the market, and to do so with higher prices.
The rm adjusts prices to account for the higher value of recommendations in the market, and
this may increase or decrease prices. The sign and intensity of the change depends on the exact
market conguration with word of mouth. Firm prots increase due to higher demand, but the
impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous. Consumers searching with recommendations benet
from lower search costs, but a price increase could o¤set this benet. Inspection of prices in
the word of mouth equilibrium and our analysis above suggest that consumer surplus increases
when taste fragmentation T and sampling costs c are low, and the cost of recommendations r is
high. To be sure, consumer surplus is strictly higher than with evaluations only. Also note that,
independently of the aggregate impact on consumer surplus, individual consumers always benet
from taste matching when seeking recommendations.
Our model shows that consumers and the rm have strong incentives to use and deploy mecha-
nisms that facilitate taste matching in the market. Several such mechanisms have emerged on the
Internet, facilitated by cumulative innovations and its decentralized architecture. Consumers can
use search engines to locate community sites that share their interests, browse the collections of
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akin users on peer-to-peer networks, and interact with fan communities on social networks. More
recently, online retailers and content providers have become major players in this area by heavily
investing to deploy and develop recommender systems. These systems mostly rely on collaborative
ltering techniques, generating recommendations by identifying taste similarity in consumer prefer-
ence data, and essentially automating the taste matching process.10 Our model explains how these
systems create value in the market. Indeed, if rms o¤ering better recommendations can capture
a share of the value they generate, recommenders can sustain a competitive advantage. We next
discuss the strategic implications of our ndings for the rm.
In real world applications, recommender systems exhibit a learning curve to identify a con-
sumers preferences. Due to this, consumers generally face switching costs to obtain recommen-
dations from competing systems. Recommender systems also exhibit network e¤ects due to the
information sparsity problem; the larger the database on consumer preferences, the more accurate
the recommendations generated. Both factors suggest the rm can benet from rewarding con-
sumers to join the system, growing its userbase and benetting from a lock-in phenomenon. And
since our model shows that consumers with uncommon preferences derive higher utility from the
system, they also exhibit higher willingness to pay for its recommendations.
Recommender systems reduce consumers incentives to evaluate products. Our model predicts
that the mass of consumers searching with evaluations decreases in presence of the recommender.
Due to the information sparsity problem, rewarding evaluating consumers for the information they
provide may become an important strategic consideration. This problem has been considered by
Avery et al. [5]. From a mechanism design perspective, our search model with heterogeneous pref-
erences contributes two insights. First, information on product matches, rather than on products
that failed to yield a match, is more valuable for large assortments and should command a higher
reward. Second, due to their lower presence in the population and the value generated from their
input, product evaluations from consumers with uncommon preferences should also command a
higher reward.
Finally, the potential of recommender systems to reduce the concentration of sales drives other
10A taxonomy of recommender systems and an overview of the related computer science literature are presented
by Adomavicius and Tuzhilin [2]. For a brief discussion on the economics of recommender systems, see Resnick and
Varian [15].
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strategic considerations. In particular, if rms di¤er in their inventory costs, the long tail e¤ect will
benet those rms with low costs, capable of increasing the depth of their assortment beyond that
of competitors and catering to niche consumers and products. It is unsurprising then that online
retail and the advent of digital distribution, characterized by such a competitive advantage, have
fostered the development and widespread deployment of recommender systems.11
5 Concluding remarks
We have provided a theoretical framework to understand the impact of consumer search on the con-
centration of sales and its implications for the rm. In doing so, our model contributes a foundation
to understand the value of product recommendations in markets characterized by large assortments
of horizontally di¤erentiated products. We have analyzed the impact of product evaluations and
word of mouth, and shown that they reduce consumer search costs and increase the concentration of
sales. This can explain their prevalence in the markets considered, such as music, cinema, literature
or video game entertainment, also characterized by high concentration. Therefore, consumers with
uncommon preferences in the population and the products that appeal to them are underserved in
the market.
Building on these results, we have analyzed the impact of mechanisms that improve taste
matching in the word of mouth exchange. Such mechanisms have become commonplace with
recent developments in telecommunications and information technologies, and allow consumers
seeking product recommendations to obtain them from others that share their taste. We have
shown that matching reduces search costs by improving the e¢ ciency of the information exchange
between consumers, and also reduces the concentration of sales. This result contributes to the
long tail debate, as matching is arguably playing an important role in the markets where the long
tail has been reported. It is also a rst step to understand the mechanisms that can reduce sales
concentration, since other mechanisms previously considered in the literature such as advertising
and product popularity information have been shown to increase it.
11Consider for example the case of Netix and Blockbuster. It has been reported that Netixs recommender
system drives 60 percent of its movie rentals, most of them titles not readily available in traditional video stores. See
The screens issue. If you liked this, youre sure to love that,The New York Times, November 23, 2008.
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A prominent case of taste matching can be found in the recommender systems implemented
by major online retailers on their storefronts. Our framework provides a rationale for the presence
of an unbiased recommender, and the rms incentives to reduce search costs in the market may
outweigh strategic opportunities for the manipulation of product recommendations. Accounting for
consumer trust and supply side competition would only intensify the case. Amazon, for example,
allows third-party sellers to supply the products indexed by its recommender system, limiting its
ability to protably manipulate recommendations.
While the long tail debate has focused on the concentration of sales, we have shown that a long
tail e¤ect such as that driven by taste matching increases the sales volume of products that appeal to
smaller shares of the consumer population. Higher demand for these products can increase product
variety in the long term. In artistic markets, such an e¤ect provides incentives for emerging artists
and those that appeal to smaller audiences to participate in the market. Lower sales concentration
may only be one of the shorter term implications of improved taste matching in markets.
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